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One’s own face possesses two properties that make it prone to grab attention: it is a 
face and, in addition, it is a self-referential stimulus. The question of whether the self-face 
is actually an especially attention grabbing stimulus was addressed by using a face-name 
interference paradigm. We investigated whether interference from a flanking self-face on 
the processing of a target classmate’s name was stronger than interference from a 
classmate’s flanking face on the processing of one’s own name as the target. In a control 
condition a third familiar face served as the flanker for both decisions from the 
participant’s own name and from the classmate’s name. The presentation of the self-face as 
a flanker produced significantly more interference on the identification of a classmate’s 
name than the presentation of that classmate’s face did on the identification of one’s own 
name. This result was due to the interfering power of the self-face and not to a particular 
resistance of one’s name to interfering facial stimuli. We argue that the emotional value or 





The distractive power of human faces seems to be particularly strong. Several studies 
found that when shown the name of a familiar person and asked to classify the person by 
occupation (e.g. as an actor or a politician), participants were slowed when the name was 
accompanied by a distracter face from the opposite category (e.g. Bindemann, Burton, & 
Jenkins, 2005; Lavie, Ro, & Russell, 2003; Young, Ellis, Flude, Mc Weeny, & Hay, 1986). 
This slowdown is known as a (in)congruency effect. Asymmetrically, the presence of a 
distracter name did not affect, or affected to a lesser extent, semantic categorization of a 
person from his or her face. Recently, Lavie et al. (2003) suggested that faces are particularly 
hard to ignore because of their particular biological and social significance. It would not be 
adaptive to ignore faces, even if they are not task relevant, because they have the potential to 
carry important social cues.  
Self-relevance is a property that makes stimuli particularly prone to attract one’s attention 
as revealed by behavioral responses (Bargh, 1982) or electrophysiological measures (i.e. P300 
event related potentials; Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004; Ninomiya, Onitsuka, 
Chen, Sato, & Tashiro, 1998). One’s own face may be seen as a particular stimulus in the 
sense that it possesses two properties that are prone to grab attention: it is a face and it is a 
self-referential stimulus. Does possessing these two properties makes the self-face be an 
especially attention grabbing stimulus? This question which, to the best of our knowledge, has 
not been tackled before is addressed in the present study. 
We investigated whether one’s own face is more difficult to ignore as a distracter 
compared with another familiar face (a classmate’s face) when performing a name 
identification task (self-name vs classmate’s name).  In order to test whether one’s own face is 
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a particularly strong face distracter, interference from one’s own face on the processing of a 
target classmate’s name was compared with interference from that classmate’s face on the 
processing of one’s own name as the target. This procedure must include a control condition. 
Indeed the own name itself has also been presented as a stimulus that is special for attention 
(Moray, 1959; Wolford & Morrison, 1980). Hence, the procedure described here above, 
might not allow deciding whether the occurrence of a stronger incongruency effect when the 
self-face is the distracter reflects a stronger interference from the participant’s own face on the 
processing of the classmate’s name (compared with interference from the classmate’s face on 
the processing of one’s name) or a stronger resistance of one’s name to the interference from 
the classmate’s face (compared with the resistance of the classmate’s name to one’s own 
face). However, recent research indicated that the visual presentation of one’s own name does 
not really grab attention (Harris & Pashler, 2004; Harris, Pashler, & Coburn, 2004). The 
appearance of one’s own name may provoke a momentary response of surprise that habituates 
rapidly, but would not enduringly capture attention. Nevertheless, to control whether one’s 
own name was more resistant to incongruent faces than the classmate’s name, a third 
distracter face (the face of a professor familiar to all participants) was used both when the 
participant’s own name was the target and when the classmate’s name was the target. 
In the current experiment, participants were asked to search for a name among two letter 
strings in the center of a display and to indicate by a speeded key press whether it was their 
own name or that of a classmate. Letter strings were accompanied with a face to be ignored. 
The distracter could be the face of the person named (congruent condition) or the face of 
another person (incongruent conditions). In all conditions, the person named was either the 
participant or her/his classmate; in the incongruent conditions the distracter face was either 










Twenty-four volunteers (16 women) aged between 18 and 27 years (mean age = 21.1) 
participated. They had known their same gender classmate for at least 2 years. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were recruited by pairs 
so that each participant served as the classmate for another participant. They had all 
attended one of the courses of the professor whose face was used as stimulus (see Stimuli) 
during at least one full semester. All participants gave written informed consent. 
 
Stimuli 
A full face, frontal view photograph of each participant showing a neutral facial 
expression was taken with a digital camera (Nikon Coolpix 2500). None of these participants 
had facial hair or wore glasses. The set of stimuli was tailored for each participant: one 
photograph of the participant’s own face, one photograph of a same gender participant’s 
classmate, and finally one photograph of the participant’s professor of biology (Professor 
Pascal Poncin for all participants) were used as face stimuli. These images were cropped to 
remove extraneous background, but the outlines of faces including differences in hairstyle 
were preserved. In addition, the participant’s forename and her/his classmate’s forename 
served as name stimuli. 
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All face stimuli were greyscale images on a grey background. Each face was placed in an 
imaginary rectangle that measured 4.3 cm X 3.5 cm (subtending 4.1 X 3.3° of visual angle at 
a viewing distance of 60 cm, with its centre 5° from fixation). The names were printed in 
black and typed with Arial font size 12.  These names contained 5 to 10 letters. Each name 
appeared with one letter string that was randomly selected among 6 pre-established strings of 
4 to 8 letters. Names were equally likely to appear in top or down position.  
Displays contained a central part in which the name and the meaningless letter string 
appeared. This central part was flanked by a distracter face that could be congruent or 
incongruent with the target name (see Figure 1). Therefore, in the congruent condition, the 
participant’s own name was flanked by the participant’s own face, or the classmate’s name 
was flanked by the classmate’s face. In one incongruent condition (incongruent classmate-self 
condition), the participant’s own name was flanked by the classmate’s face and the 
classmate’s name was flanked by the participant’s face. Note that hereafter the words “self-
face” always refer to the participant’s own face. In the other incongruent condition 
(incongruent professor condition), both the participant’s and the classmate’s names were 
flanked by the professor’s face. Distracters were equally likely to appear on the left or right of 
the target (this manipulation produced no significant effect and is therefore not reported 
further below). 
 




Subjects viewed the displays at a distance of 60 cm. Each trial began with a fixation cross 
appearing for 500 ms. Then the display was presented until the participant responded. The 
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participants were instructed to classify the target name as being their own name or their 
classmate’s name, as quickly and as accurately as possible, while ignoring the face distracter. 
Button-press response latencies were measured from stimulus onset. Participants completed 
one practice block of 24 items and one experimental block of 96 trials each. Within each 
block, all conditions were randomly intermixed.  
 
Design 
The design was 2 (Target name: self vs classmate) X 3 (Condition: congruent distracter 





The overall error rate was low (1.8 %). A two-way 2 (Target) X 3 (Condition) ANOVA 
with repeated measures on both factors was conducted on the error rates. This analysis 
revealed no main effect of the Target (F < 1), no main effect of the Condition (F < 1) and no 
interaction between these factors (F < 1).  
Mean correct response times were calculated for each participant in each cell of the 
design, removing all RTs below 200 ms and over 1500 ms (0.3% of measures were removed). 
A two-way 2 (Target) X 3 (Condition) ANOVA with repeated measures on both factors was 
carried out on these mean correct RTs and revealed a main Target name effect, F(1,23) = 
8.30, MSE = 2357, p < .01, RTs were shorter for the own name (M = 602 ms, SD = 92) than 
for the classmate’s name (M = 626 ms, SD = 82). The ANOVA also revealed a main effect of 
Condition, F(2, 46) = 15.14, MSE = 1150, p < .0001, that was qualified by a marginally 
significant interaction, F(2,46) = 3.03, MSE = 1448, p = .058. 
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Planned comparisons indicated that the professor’s face interfered both on the 
categorization of one’s own name, t(23) = 2.47; p < .05, and on the categorization of the 
classmate’s name, t(23) = 2.69; p < .05. Respectively, mean RTs were significantly slower in 
the “self name / incongruent professor” condition (M = 611ms, SD = 111) than in the “self 
name / congruent face” condition (M = 587 ms, SD = 84), and mean RTs were significantly 
slower in the “classmate’s name / incongruent professor” condition (M = 621ms, SD = 88) 
than in the “classmate’s name / congruent face” condition (M = 601 ms, SD = 88). The 
magnitude of the interference due to the professor’s face was similar for the own name (M = 
24 ms) and the classmate’s name (M = 20 ms), a t-test indicated that the difference between 
these two means was not significant, t < 1. 
Therefore, the own name was not more resistant to the irrelevant professor’s face than the 
classmate’s name was. Further planned comparisons showed that the self-face interfered on 
the categorization of the classmate’s name, t(23) = 6.47; p < .0001, and that the classmate’s 
face interfered on the categorization of one’s own name, t(23) = 2.22; p < .05. Respectively, 
mean RTs were significantly slower in the “classmate’s name / incongruent self-face” 
condition (M = 655 ms, SD = 82) than in the “classmate’s name / congruent face” condition, 
and mean RTs were significantly slower in the “self name / incongruent classmate” condition 
(M = 609 ms, SD = 96) than in the “self name / congruent face” condition. However, the 
magnitude of the interference of the self-face on the categorization of the classmate’s name 
(M = 53 ms) was significantly higher than that of the classmate’s face on the categorization of 
one’s own name (M = 22 ms), t(23) = 2.41; p < .05. Descriptive data are presented on Figure 
2. Finally, RTs in the “self name / congruent face” condition were not significantly shorter 
than RTs in the “classmate name / congruent face” condition, t(23) = 1.66; p = 0.11. 
 





Previous research showed that faces are difficult to ignore and that distracter faces 
interfere with the processing of target non-facial information (Bindemann et al., 2005; Lavie 
et al., 2003; Young et al., 1986). Self-referential information has also been presented as 
particularly prone to capture attention (e.g. Bargh, 1982; Gray et al., 2004). The present study 
investigated whether one’s own face, being both a facial and a self-relevant stimulus, is more 
difficult to ignore than other familiar faces. Results of the current experiment showed that, 
indeed, the self-face is particularly hard to ignore. In a person identification task from target 
names, the presentation of the self-face as an incongruent flanker produced significantly more 
interference on the identification of a classmate’s name than the presentation of that 
classmate’s face did on the identification of one’s own name. This result is clearly due to the 
interfering power of the self-face and not to a particular resistance of one’s name to 
interfering facial stimuli. Indeed, the magnitude of interference due to the presentation of the 
face of a participant’s professor was very similar when categorizing the participant’s own 
name and when categorizing the classmate’s name. 
Present results are also consistent with previous studies in confirming that faces are powerful 
distracting stimuli (Bindemann et al., 2005; Lavie et al., 2003). Indeed, participants were 
unable to ignore irrelevant distracter faces, i.e. their own face, a classmate’s face or a familiar 
professor’s face, whatever they processed their own name or a classmate’s name. It would be 
interesting to investigate in a future study the pattern of interference obtained by reversing the 
positions of the faces and names. 
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Why is the self-face more distracting than other familiar faces? When explaining the 
attention grabbing property of self-relevant stimuli some authors have invoked the particular 
emotional value of these stimuli (Bargh, 1982 ; Gray et al., 2004). This explanation seems to 
be particularly relevant as far as the self-face is concerned. Indeed, one’s own face is a 
stimulus of very high emotional importance. The face is a particularly invested part of one’s 
appearance (McNeill, 1998). Recently, functional neuroimaging studies of visual self-
recognition using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) reported an activation of the 
right limbic system that was interpreted as a strong emotional response to seeing our own face 
(Kircher et al., 2000; 2001). Although many studies have found that faces showing a negative 
facial expression are more effective at grabbing attention than faces showing a positive 
expression (for recent reviews see Lundquist & Öhman, 2005; Pessoa, 2005), it should not be 
over-generalized that attention is oriented only, or even mainly, to negatively valenced faces. 
Indeed, in a recent study, Stone and Valentine (2005) reported that faces of liked familiar 
persons, or familiar persons regarded as good, are more likely to attract attention than disliked 
familiar persons, or familiar persons regarded as evil. Therefore positively valenced faces 
may also be very effective at attracting attention. 
Another factor that might explain the strong distracting power of the self-face observed in 
the present study is its extreme familiarity. One’s own face is processed several times a day 
during the entire lifetime. Tong and Nakayama (1999) showed that participants were faster to 
recognize their own face, relative to an unfamiliar face, in different visual search tasks, even 
after hundreds of presentation of the unfamiliar face. These authors suggested that this 
processing advantage occurs because we develop robust representations for faces of which we 
have an extensive visual experience. It will be necessary to determine what aspects of this 
visual experience are important. For instance, our participants presumably experienced their 
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classmate’s face more often than their own face in the recent past. Yet, the own face was more 
difficult to ignore than the classmate’s face. 
Practical implications of the present results may be important. For example, in severely 
brain-damaged non-communicative vegetative or minimally conscious patients, it is well 
known that the bedside evaluation of potential residual self-awareness is very difficult 
(Giacino & Whyte, 2005). Recent functional neuroimaging studies have used self-referential 
stimuli to objectively quantify patients’ cerebral processing during visual presentation of 
familiar faces in the vegetative state (Owen et al., 2002) and during auditory presentation of 
the patients’ own name in the minimally conscious state (Laureys et al., 2004). Similarly, 
event related potential studies have aimed to identify P300 responses to patients’ own name as 
compared to other names in these pathologies (Perrin et al., submitted). Building upon the 
present results, future studies should further disentangle what self-referential stimuli and 
modalities are most powerful at seizing attention in healthy subjects, justifying their 
subsequent use in the assessment of non-communicative patients.  
In conclusion, the present research confirms that the presence of a face in the environment 
is particularly prone to attract attention even when this face is irrelevant to the task at hand, 
and demonstrates that some faces are more powerful distracters than others. More 
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Figure 1. Examples of display.  
 
Figure 2. Mean RTs (in ms) for classifying target names as one’s own name or a 
classmate’s name as a function of the condition: congruent distracter, incongruent classmate-
self distracter (i.e. the classmate’s face when the target is the participant’s name and the 
participant’s face when the target is the classmate’s name), and finally the incongruent 
professor distracter. Vertical bars represent the standard error of the means. 
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